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The Fight for Equal Protection: 
Reconstruction-Redemption Redux 
Kermit Roosevelt III† 
Patricia Stottlemyer†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Antonin Scalia is gone. Who will replace him? Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg is eighty-three, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
seventy-nine, Justice Stephen Breyer seventy-seven. Which seats 
will open up during the next president’s term? 
No one knows, of course, but we do know that there is the 
possibility of significant movement on the Supreme Court in the 
next several years. A Democratic president could appoint a re-
placement for Scalia and maybe even another Republican appoin-
tee. Or a Republican could fill Scalia’s seat and then have the 
chance to pick the successor to Ginsburg or Breyer. It depends on 
who wins the presidential election, of course, and also the vagar-
ies of health and other factors that go into a justice’s decision to 
retire, but it is likely that the next four years will move the Court, 
either to the left or the right, by at least one vote, and quite pos-
sibly two. 
Either would be a stunning change. Most Americans have 
grown up accustomed to a 5–4 divide, with a real but not always 
reliable conservative majority. The Rehnquist Court gave us this 
pattern as early as 1991, when Justice Clarence Thomas replaced 
Justice Thurgood Marshall to shift power to the right. The ap-
pointments after that made changes at the margins—Ginsburg 
was certainly more liberal than Justice Byron White,1 Breyer at 
the beginning of his tenure more conservative than Justice Harry 
 
 † Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 †† Toll Public Interest Scholar and JD Candidate 2017, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School. 
 1 Christopher E. Smith, Joyce A. Baugh, and Thomas R. Hensley, The First-Term 
Performance of Justice Stephen Breyer, 79 Judicature 74, 76 (1995) (“White was arguably 
more conservative than Ginsburg with respect to certain issues.”). 
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Blackmun at the end of his,2 Justice Samuel Alito notably differ-
ent on women’s issues than Justice Sandra Day O’Connor3—but 
for twenty-five years, we have generally had four reliable con-
servatives, four reliable liberals, and either O’Connor or Kennedy 
playing the role of the median or “swing” justice.4 
The possibility of such dramatic change makes this an oppor-
tune moment to think about what is at stake—to think specifi-
cally about what kinds of doctrinal change we might see depend-
ing on how the Court shifts, and more generally about how to 
understand this historical moment. In this Essay, we try to do 
just that. A two-justice shift could upend just about any area of 
constitutional law, from the Commerce Clause, to Section Five 
enforcement power,5 to individual rights such as abortion. But the 
possible movement of equal protection jurisprudence with respect 
to racial classifications provides a particularly revealing window 
into the larger trends at work. In this context, two strongly op-
posed visions of the Constitution contend against each other, and 
change in the Court’s composition may determine the outcome of 
that struggle. 
In what follows, we first set out the current state of the Su-
preme Court’s race-based equal protection jurisprudence. We 
then note how a one- or two-justice shift, either to the right or left, 
would change that jurisprudence. Last, we use these possible ju-
risprudential changes to understand the competing constitutional 
visions and to place this moment in a larger historical context. 
I.  WHERE WE ARE NOW 
The Court’s recent encounters with race-based equal protec-
tion have almost exclusively been in the context of attempts to aid 
historically disadvantaged minorities. In these cases, the Court 
has staked out a very clear position, which is typically called the 
anticlassification view of equal protection.6 According to this view, 
 
 2 See Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, and Lee Epstein, The Median Justice, 83 
NC L Rev 1275, 1300, 1318–19 (2005). See also David M. Levitan, The Effect of the Ap-
pointment of a Supreme Court Justice, 28 U Toledo L Rev 37, 81 (1996) (noting that Breyer 
originally supported the death penalty, a traditionally conservative view, while Blackmun 
was generally opposed to it, a traditionally liberal view). 
 3 See Joan Biskupic, The Alito/O’Connor Switch, 35 Pepperdine L Rev 495, 497–
501 (2008) (discussing the differences between Alito’s and O’Connor’s positions on abortion 
rights and sex discrimination). 
 4 A.E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The Roberts Court at Seven, 98 Va L Rev In 
Brief 76, 90–92 (2012). 
 5 See US Const Amend XIV, § 5. 
 6 Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlas-
sification or Antisubordination?, 58 U Miami L Rev 9, 10 (2003). 
38  The University of Chicago Law Review Online [83:36 
   
the point of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is to protect people from being classified on the basis 
of certain characteristics. Race is the most suspect basis for clas-
sification, and all racial classifications receive strict scrutiny. Sex 
is also suspect, though somewhat less so; sex-based classifications 
receive intermediate scrutiny. 
The anticlassification approach embodies three principles ar-
ticulated in Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena:7 skepticism, con-
sistency, and congruence. These principles mean, respectively, 
(a) that racial classifications receive strict scrutiny;8 (b) that this 
scrutiny extends to all racial classifications, regardless of their 
purpose or distribution of benefits and burdens;9 and (c) that the 
first two principles apply to the states and the federal government 
equally.10 
The battles since Adarand have mostly been about how to ap-
ply strict scrutiny. The Court has recognized only two interests as 
sufficiently weighty to count as compelling: remedying the gov-
ernment’s own past discrimination, and enhancing diversity as a 
means to improve education at the post-secondary level. In Gratz 
v Bollinger11 and Grutter v Bollinger,12 the Rehnquist Court, with 
Justice O’Connor as the median justice, achieved a sort of détente 
between supporters and opponents of affirmative action: explicit 
consideration of race in higher education admissions was permis-
sible, the Court suggested, as long as race was one factor consid-
ered among many, had no fixed weight, and was part of a holistic, 
individualized assessment of each applicant.13 (Rigid mechanical 
or quota-based systems, by contrast, were forbidden.)14 
 
 7 515 US 200 (1995). Adarand held that strict scrutiny must be applied to all racial 
classifications, whether benign or otherwise, imposed by the federal government, state 
governments, and local governments alike. See id at 226–27. Metro Broadcasting, Inc v 
FCC, 497 US 547 (1990), had previously held that benign racial classifications by the fed-
eral government could be scrutinized less closely. Id at 564–65. 
 8 Adarand, 515 US at 223–24. 
 9 Id at 224. 
 10 See id. By holding that strict scrutiny must be applied to all racial classifications, 
whether benign or otherwise, imposed by the federal government, state government, and 
local governments alike, the Court overruled its previous holding in Metro Broadcasting. 
Id at 224–27. 
 11  539 US 244 (2003). 
 12  539 US 306 (2003). 
 13  Compare Gratz, 539 US at 271–76 (finding that the university’s admissions policy 
of awarding a twenty-point bonus to minority applicants was not narrowly tailored), with 
Grutter, 539 US at 337–39 (finding that the university’s “holistic” admission process, 
which considered race as one of many factors, was narrowly tailored). 
 14  Grutter, 539 US at 334. 
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The Roberts Court saw the replacement of O’Connor by Jus-
tice Alito, which made Justice Kennedy the new median justice. 
The effects of that shift were visible in Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v Seattle School District No 1,15 in which the Court 
invalidated programs that sometimes used race in assigning stu-
dents to elementary and secondary schools in an effort to avoid de 
facto segregation.16 
Parents Involved differed from the ordinary affirmative ac-
tion context in that school assignment was not a merit-based com-
petition.17 That might have alleviated some of the common con-
cerns about affirmative action—that valued admission slots were 
being given to undeserving applicants, that beneficiaries of the 
program suffered stigma, or that recipients of preferences would 
end up in schools too competitive for them.18 Nonetheless, the plu-
rality opinion viewed the program with extreme skepticism. Chief 
Justice John Roberts, writing for the plurality, pronounced the 
state’s interest in diversity for its own sake as being not just less 
than compelling but actually illegitimate,19 and he interpreted 
Brown v Board of Education of Topeka20 to condemn not segrega-
tion or stigma but the mere fact of classification.21 Kennedy, con-
curring, moderated the plurality’s position by suggesting that a 
state’s desire to avoid de facto segregation was in fact compelling 
and that states might pursue it by methods short of explicit racial 
classification, such as “drawing attendance zones with general 
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods.”22 Kennedy, 
though, suggested that explicit classifications would rarely, if 
ever, survive.23 
 
 15  551 US 701 (2007). Parents Involved solidified the Court’s current anticlassifica-
tion approach to affirmative action. 
 16  Id at 709–11, 747–48. 
 17  Compare Parents Involved, 551 US at 711–18 (explaining that the use of affirma-
tive action was part of the random allocation of pupils among public schools in the district), 
with Gratz, 539 US at 253–57 (explaining the many merit-based qualifications considered 
as part of the admissions process). 
 18  See, for example, Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor Jr, The Painful Truth about 
Affirmative Action (The Atlantic, Oct 2, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/9K3T-PEKP. 
 19  Parents Involved, 551 US at 729–33 (Roberts) (plurality). 
 20  347 US 483 (1954). Brown prohibited racial segregation of public schools on the 
grounds that segregation inevitably stigmatized minority students and produced inherent 
inequality. Id at 495. 
 21  Parents Involved, 551 US at 746–48. 
 22 Id at 789 (Kennedy concurring). Such measures, he suggested, would not receive 
strict scrutiny. Id. 
 23  Id at 789–91 (Kennedy concurring). 
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II.  WHERE WE MIGHT GO: ONE-JUSTICE SHIFTS 
The situation after Parents Involved seems volatile and inco-
herent. Justice Kennedy’s position seemed to be motivated by a 
somewhat idiosyncratic concern that explicit racial classifications 
involve the government’s assignment of a racial identity that in-
dividuals might not share, what he described as “a classification 
that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race.”24 This 
interest in self-definition is a common concern of Kennedy’s juris-
prudence, expressed most strikingly in the so-called sweet mys-
tery of life passage from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v Casey.25 But this concern does not seem to be 
shared by other justices in the equal protection context. And Ken-
nedy’s suggestion that measures short of explicit racial classifica-
tions may be used to achieve racial diversity without facing strict 
scrutiny is hard to square with the Court’s longstanding prece-
dents holding that intentional use of a facially neutral tool to 
achieve a preferred racial result is treated like an explicit classi-
fication.26 
Before Justice Scalia’s death, then, it seemed likely that 
equal protection jurisprudence would continue its rightward drift. 
Kennedy, as the median justice, would move the Court a bit fur-
ther, most likely in the direction of a repudiation of Grutter and a 
categorical ban on the explicit consideration of race in school ad-
missions. That seemed to be the suggestion of the Court’s first 
Fisher v University of Texas at Austin27 decision: strict scrutiny 
should be applied in the traditional, “fatal in fact” manner rather 
than the more permissive version assumed after the Court’s deci-
sion in Grutter.28 The Fifth Circuit did not get the memo, though, 
 
 24  Id at 789 (Kennedy concurring). 
 25  505 US 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”). 
 26  See, for example, Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 241 (1976) (“A statute, other-
wise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis 
of race.”). 
 27  133 S Ct 2411 (2013) (“Fisher I”). Fisher I held that the Fifth Circuit had improp-
erly applied strict scrutiny. While the Fifth Circuit had allowed a presumption that the 
school acted in good faith when it classified on the basis of race, leaving the burden with 
petitioner to rebut that presumption, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, stated that 
Grutter places the burden on the university to prove its program is narrowly tailored, and 
that no deference is due to the university. Id at 2419–20.  
 28  Id at 2421. In Parents Involved, Kennedy did suggest that explicit consideration 
of race would be permissible if necessary, but the import of Fisher I seems to be that ne-
cessity means more than it did in Grutter. Compare Parents Involved, 551 US at 790 (Ken-
nedy concurring) (stating that explicit race classifications “may be considered legitimate 
only if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling interest”) with Fisher I, 133 S Ct at 
2420 (observing that “strict scrutiny does require a court to examine with care, and not 
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leaving the Court poised to explain itself more clearly and force-
fully in the second Fisher v University of Texas at Austin.29 
But with Scalia no longer on the Court, that outcome did not 
come to pass.30 Instead, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit, in a 
Kennedy opinion that sounded much more like the O’Connor of 
Grutter than the Kennedy of Parents Involved.31 If a Republican 
appointee replaces Scalia, we may see a slight tack back to the 
right, but otherwise the future of affirmative action looks sud-
denly brighter. If a Democratic president appoints Scalia’s suc-
cessor instead, Justice Breyer will become the new median jus-
tice. At the least, that would preserve the Gratz-Grutter 
compromise. Strict scrutiny might well persist for race-based af-
firmative action, but it would be the watered-down, deferential 
strict scrutiny of Grutter. In fact, a new, five-justice liberal major-
ity could push the law substantially further. But there are also 
reasons it might stay its hand: disagreement with prior decisions 
is not necessarily sufficient motivation to overrule them, preserv-
ing the Gratz-Grutter status quo might seem enough of an accom-
plishment, and with only five votes the Court might not want to 
risk a sudden tack back if the balance shifted again. We thus post-
pone discussion of the more ambitious liberal move for the next 
Part. 
III.  WHERE WE MIGHT GO: TWO-JUSTICE SHIFTS 
What if the change on the Court is more dramatic? If a Re-
publican president appoints Justice Scalia’s successor and then 
gets the chance to replace a Democratic appointee like Justice 
Ginsburg or Justice Breyer, the median justice will be someone to 
the right of Justice Kennedy, and there is another shoe waiting to 
 
defer to, a university’s serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alterna-
tives”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 29  758 F3d 663, 642–49 (5th Cir 2014), cert granted, 135 S Ct 2888 (2015) (applying 
strict scrutiny on remand and upholding the University of Texas’s affirmative action pro-
gram). The Fifth Circuit found for the university after the remand of Fisher I, and the 
Court granted certiorari again to review that decision. In Fisher v University of Texas at 
Austin, 2016 WL 3434399 (US) (“Fisher II”), the Supreme Court decided that the Fifth 
Circuit properly applied strict scrutiny as articulated in Fisher I. Id at *14–15. 
 30  Scalia’s death did not eliminate the conservative majority in Fisher II, because 
Justice Elena Kagan recused herself. It did, however, mean that Kennedy remained the 
median justice for Fisher II.  
      31 See Garrett Epps, How Affirmative Action Won the Day (The Atlantic, June 23, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/W67E-VTWT (“Kennedy has now placed himself firmly 
in the Powell-O’Connor camp.”). 
42  The University of Chicago Law Review Online [83:36 
   
drop—the theory that disparate impact causes of action are un-
constitutional. The Ricci v DeStefano32 decision foreshadowed this 
possibility. In that case, the City of New Haven threw out the re-
sults of a test it had used for promoting firefighters on the 
grounds that it appeared to have a disparate impact on minority 
candidates.33 But throwing out the results was disparate treat-
ment—intentional race discrimination—according to the Su-
preme Court, and impermissible under Title VII.34 
Ricci thus shows us one feature which is apparently already 
part of our equal protection jurisprudence: attempts to avert or 
remedy disparate impact count as intentional discrimination and 
will receive strict scrutiny.35 But Scalia, in his concurrence, hinted 
at another possibility for equal protection jurisprudence. Because 
Title VII shifts the burden to the employer to show a business 
justification for employment practices with disparate impact,36 
employers presumably have an incentive to avoid or remedy dis- 
parate impact—which is to say, in Ricci’s terms, that it gives em-
ployers an incentive to engage in intentional discrimination.37 
Is a law that encourages private racial discrimination (even 
if that discrimination is intended to be beneficent) constitutional? 
Quite possibly not, Scalia suggested.38 The ambitious conservative 
move in race-based equal protection, then, might be to use the 
Equal Protection Clause not simply to ban explicit considerations 
of race but also to ban disparate impact lawsuits—to invalidate 
any legislative attempt to give disparate impact legal signifi-
cance. It seemed possible that the Court might take that step in 
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive 
 
 32  557 US 557 (2009). 
 33  Id at 561–63. 
 34  Id at 563. 
 35  See id at 582 (noting that “certain government actions to remedy past racial dis-
crimination—actions that are themselves based on race—are constitutional only where 
there is a strong basis in evidence that remedial actions were necessary”) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 36  Ricci, 557 US at 594–95 (Scalia concurring). 
 37 Id at 581 (“Allowing employers to violate the disparate-treatment prohibition 
based on a mere good-faith fear of disparate-impact liability would encourage race-based 
action at the slightest hint of disparate impact.”). 
 38  See id at 594 (Scalia concurring) (observing that “[the Court’s] resolution of this 
dispute merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to confront the ques-
tion: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII . . . con-
sistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection? The question is not an  
easy one.”). 
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Communities Project, Inc,39 but it did not.40 Shift the median to 
the right of Kennedy, though, and such a move becomes increas-
ingly likely. 
What about the liberals? Simply replacing Scalia with a Dem-
ocratic appointee moves the median to Breyer; another liberal re-
placement of a conservative could move it further. A solid six- 
justice liberal majority would likely feel less constrained by prec-
edent and freer to take bold steps. The new majority could turn 
its attention to disparate impact. The reconstructed Court might 
assert not only that statutes giving disparate impact legal signif-
icance are constitutional, but also that the Constitution, too, 
counts it as significant. The liberal majority could find that equal 
protection analysis, like Title VII, shifts the burden to the defend-
ant upon a plaintiff’s mere showing of disparate impact. 
An ambitious liberal majority might also revise the anti- 
classification approach to equal protection. Before Adarand’s con-
sistency principle appeared, the Supreme Court suggested that 
not all racial classifications were the same. It suggested that clas-
sifications intended to benefit a disadvantaged minority were less 
suspect than classifications that burdened that minority.41 This 
implication is clear in the famous footnote four of United States v 
Carolene Products Co42 and in the criteria announced in Frontiero 
v Richardson43 for deciding whether a particular group counted as 
a suspect class.44 
 
 39  135 S Ct 2507, 2513 (2015) (addressing whether the Fair Housing Act allowed for 
disparate impact liability). Some have argued that reading the statute to allow for dis-
parate impact liability rendered it unconstitutional. See, for example, Brief of Amici Cu-
riae Judicial Watch, Inc and Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Petitioners, 
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive Communities Project, 
Inc, No 13-1371, *7–12 (US filed Nov 24, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 6706834) 
(arguing that “[t]he only way to treat the troubled concept of ‘race’ in the law should be to 
absolutely prohibit its use as a basis for making decisions affecting individuals or groups”); 
Michael K. Grimaldi, Disparate Impact after Ricci and Lewis, 14 Scholar 165, 166–67 
(2011) (explaining that conservatives think that the disparate-impact prohibition should 
be abandoned). 
 40 Texas Department of Housing, 135 S Ct at 2521–22, 2525–26. 
 41 See, for example, Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448, 480–82 (1980) (finding a gov-
ernment program that gave preference to minority-owned businesses was constitutional 
and “reject[ing] the contention that in the remedial context the Congress must act in a 
wholly ‘color-blind’ fashion”). 
 42 304 US 144 (1938). Carolene Product’s footnote four announced the criteria that 
should trigger closer scrutiny from the Court: those being discriminated against are “dis-
crete and insular minorities,” and the political process is not functioning to properly pro-
tect the interests of the groups at issue. Id at 152 n 4. 
 43  411 US 677 (1973). 
 44  Id at 684–86 (announcing that a “suspect class,” meaning one needing the govern-
ment’s protection through the application of heightened scrutiny, could be distinguished 
44  The University of Chicago Law Review Online [83:36 
   
If it did this, the Court would be restoring a different under-
standing of the Equal Protection Clause, what is called the anti-
subordination perspective. Rather than prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on certain characteristics, this understanding of the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits oppressive or unjustified dis-
crimination.45 Heightened scrutiny is used to evaluate only clas-
sifications that are highly likely to be oppressive—something that 
can be said much more easily of discrimination against a vulner-
able minority than discrimination in its favor.46 
Like the conservative repudiation of disparate impact, this 
would be an ambitious move. But just as the ground has been laid 
for the conservative move in Ricci, building blocks for the return 
to antisubordination exist. One could point to the continued vital-
ity of antisubordination discourse in sex discrimination, perhaps 
most notably in Ginsburg’s majority opinion in United States v 
Virginia.47 Ginsburg has made notable attempts to shift the basis 
for the Court’s abortion jurisprudence to a rationale rooted in 
equality; one could easily imagine her embracing a doctrinal dis-
tinction between benign and invidious classifications. 
IV.  THE SHIFTS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The discussion to this point has suggested modest and more 
ambitious moves that might result from changing membership on 
the Supreme Court. Those moves may be understood as steps to-
wards the fulfillment of two different visions of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The conservative anticlassification view would bar 
any government consideration of race, even if the intent is to avert 
or remedy the disparate impact of the government’s own policies. 
It would likewise bar any attempt to encourage private employers 
to avoid or remedy disparate impact. The Equal Protection 
Clause, under this view, would stand as a barrier to most govern-
ment attempts to promote racial equality. It would have the ef-
fect, in many cases, of leaving undisturbed or even locking in ex-
isting racial inequalities. 
 
by several characteristics, including the following: the group (1) has suffered a history of 
unjustified discrimination; (2) is defined by an immutable, unchosen characteristic; (3) is 
defined by a characteristic that is irrelevant to merit; (4) has a lack of political power; and 
(5) is presently suffering from discrimination). 
 45 John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination 
Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 Fordham 
L Rev 423, 515 (2002). 
 46 Id at 517. 
 47 518 US 515, 531–34 (1996). 
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The liberal antisubordination view, by contrast, would give 
the government a freer hand in attempting to promote racial 
equality. Under this view, the Equal Protection Clause would pre-
vent race-based oppression or attempts to create a racial caste 
system, but not attempts to bring the races together or to break 
down racial hierarchy.48 
The liberal vision here is relatively easy to locate in history. 
It expresses the meaning assigned to the Equal Protection Clause 
in the Reconstruction era. The Court was not a friend to Recon-
struction, but it did consistently describe the purpose of the Equal 
Protection Clause as averting “unfriendly action” based on “jeal-
ousy and positive dislike”49 or which might “necessarily imply the 
inferiority of either race,”50 stamp one race “with a badge of infe-
riority,”51 or be enacted “for the annoyance or oppression of a par-
ticular class.”52 
What about the conservative vision? The anticlassification 
view can be found in stray sentences of early cases, such as 
Strauder v West Virginia’s53 suggestion that “the law in the States 
shall be the same for the black as for the white.”54 But this view 
does not really emerge until Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v Bakke55 in 1978, and it does not acquire majority support 
until City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co56 in 1989 and Adarand57 
in 1995. In terms of Supreme Court membership, these decisions 
are the product of Reagan appointments—Justices O’Connor, 
Scalia, and Kennedy. We might then associate anticlassification 
with the constitutional vision of the Rehnquist and late Burger 
Courts, what is often called New Federalism. President Ronald 
Reagan, after all, kicked off his 1980 campaign with a speech in 
Philadelphia that praised states’ rights.58 
 
 48  For more on different potential motivations behind equal protection laws, see gen-
erally Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 Harv 
L Rev 493 (2003). 
 49  Strauder v West Virginia, 100 US 303, 306 (1879). 
 50  Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537, 544 (1896). 
 51  Id at 551. 
 52  Id at 550. 
 53  100 US 303 (1879). 
 54  Id at 307. 
 55  438 US 265, 290–91 (1978) (Powell) (plurality) (suggesting strict scrutiny for race-
based affirmative action programs). 
 56  488 US 469, 493–94 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to city minority business con-
tracting preference). 
 57  515 US at 223–24 (applying strict scrutiny to federal minority business contract-
ing preferences). 
 58  See, for example, Leland Ware and David C. Wilson, Jim Crow on the “Down 
Low”: Subtle Racial Appeals in Presidential Campaigns, 24 St John’s J Legal Commen 
46  The University of Chicago Law Review Online [83:36 
   
But there’s also another place to look, starting with the his-
toric antagonist of the Reconstruction vision. Reconstruction met 
opposition—from the Supreme Court, from congressional Demo-
crats, and from organizations like the Ku Klux Klan. Reconstruc-
tion failed—the North lacked the political will to maintain a mil-
itary presence in the South, and after the Compromise of 1877, 
Reconstruction yielded to “Redemption.”59 The black Reconstruc-
tion governments were overthrown by force, black voting rights 
were curtailed, and for nearly one hundred years the Constitu-
tion’s promise of equality meant almost nothing. 
Then came the Second Reconstruction—the civil rights move-
ment. A social movement for equality challenged the status quo. 
It received support from federal antidiscrimination laws and War-
ren Court decisions that expanded federal power and imposed 
new limits on the states. (Notably, these cases continued the Re-
construction antisubordination understanding of equal protec-
tion: the most famous example, Brown, invalidated school segre-
gation at least in part on the grounds that it “is usually 
interpreted as denoting . . . inferiority.”60) And it changed the sta-
tus of blacks in American society. 
It is not surprising that the Second Reconstruction was met 
with a reaction. It is perhaps more surprising that this reaction 
is commonly called the New Federalism.61 Many of the Rehnquist 
Court decisions restricting federal power do, of course, invoke fed-
eralism.62 But federalism exists in our constitutional history not 
just as an independent doctrine created by the Constitution and 
existing at the Framing. It comes to prominence in a particular 
context—notably, opposition to Reconstruction and to the race-
equality decisions of the Warren Court. And Reagan’s appeal to 
states’ rights invokes this particular context more strongly than 
it does the Framing. The Philadelphia where he delivered his 
1980 speech was not the Framers’ Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
 
299, 310–11 (2009) (suggesting that Reagan’s use of the phrase “states’ rights” was code 
for “resistance to desegregation efforts”). 
 59  Id at 308. 
 60  Brown, 347 US at 494. 
 61  See, for example, Allison H. Eid, Federalism and Formalism, 11 Wm & Mary Bill 
Rts J 1191, 1196–98 (2003). 
 62  See, for example, New York v United States, 505 US 144, 149 (1992) (“The consti-
tutional question [here] consists of discerning the proper division of authority between the 
Federal Government and the States.”). 
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but Philadelphia, Mississippi, perhaps most famous for the 1964 
murder of civil rights workers by Klan members.63 
If we look at the work of New Federalism, we see a very un-
even distribution of results. There are some relatively minimal 
restrictions on the federal commerce power.64 There are very sub-
stantial restrictions on Congress’s ability to enforce the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments.65 And there is a more or less 
total reinterpretation of the Equal Protection Clause itself.66 This 
is not a jurisprudence addressed generally to the federal-state 
balance. It is the Reconstruction Amendments that are being re-
interpreted; it is Congress’s power to enforce those amendments 
that is being cut back. This movement looks less like a rebirth of 
Founding-era federalism than a Second Redemption reaction to 
the Second Reconstruction of the Warren Court. 
 One plausible way of looking at the struggle over the Equal 
Protection Clause and the composition of the Supreme Court, 
then, is as a continuation of the struggle between Reconstruction 
and Redemption. The Court pushed back against the first Recon-
struction, in decisions like the Slaughter-house Cases,67 the Civil 
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Rights Cases,68 United States v Harris,69 and United States v 
Cruikshank.70 It is pushing back now against the Second Recon-
struction, in decisions like City of Boerne v Flores,71 Shelby County 
v Holder,72 United States v Morrison,73 Ricci,74 Parents Involved,75 
and Fisher I76 The open question now is whether history will re-
peat itself. 
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